Abstract. Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation -mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior -often resulting in lower levels of pollution -little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution -only one of which is subject to information disclosure.
Introduction
Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation -mandatory disclosure of information. Perhaps the best-known example is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program in the U.S., whereby firms are required to disclose legally emitted chemical releases. TRI has brought about significant reductions in chemical emissions. Contaminantes (2001) . While many of these programs mandate information about legal emissions, others have focused on compliance -i.e., information on whether or not the firm is meeting existing laws. Many of these programs have been designed and studied in consultation with the World Bank in developing countries including China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (see e.g., Afsah et al. 1996; Wang et al. 2004; Dasgupta et al. 2004) .
The mechanisms by which information disclosure programs lead to reductions in pollution are varied and still being studied (see e.g., Konar and Cohen 2000; Maxwell et al. 2000; Stephan 2002; Dasgupta et al. 2006) . Depending on the context, consumers may decide to reduce or withdraw from consuming the product of a firm that is a high polluter. Investors may shun the stock of firms that are found to be high polluters -either through socially active investment decisions or by an assessment that highly polluting firms will ultimately be less profitable. Victims 2 may bring about pressure on polluting firms to reduce emissions by picketing, lobbying local zoning boards for more stringent restrictions, pressuring government enforcement agencies to scrutinize large polluters more carefully, or calling for new regulations. They might also sue for damages under various theories of tort law.
Regardless of the mechanism, information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior. Tietenberg (1998) has characterized information disclosure as being the third wave of environmental regulation -following the original command and control approach and the subsequent introduction of market-based incentives such as emission fees and marketable permits. Information disclosure programs have been widely touted by policymakers for numerous reasons. One obvious benefit is the fact that information disclosure has been found to result in significant improvements in environmental quality. In addition, however, information disclosure programs satisfy the democratic belief that the public has a 'right to know' that they might be affected by third party pollution. On a more practical level, information disclosure programs are generally thought to cost the government far less than drafting and implementing industry wide regulations. As a result of these presumed benefits, information disclosure programs might also be politically more feasible than new coercive regulations. Despite these presumed benefits, information disclosure programs are not free. As with any government policy, they should be subject to the scrutiny of a cost-benefit analysis. The benefits are obvious -improvements in the environment that are presumably valued by some members of society. On the
